



NEWSLETTER

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OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR VOLUME I HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE



CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)
U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS COMMAND (CAC)
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-7000

Foreword

December 1992

This newsletter reviews the lessons from humanitarian assistance operations that immediately followed Operation DESERT STORM. The Center for Army Lessons Learned(CALL) looked at two of these operations: 3d Armored Division's role in the Safwan area, southern Iraq, and Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, a much larger effort in northern Iraq. Combined Task Force Provide Comfort was a multinational force with a security and humanitarian aspect in its mission to save the Kurds. Both operations were a remarkable success due to the superb quality of individuals and leaders, both civilian and military.

Military humanitarian assistance can be separated into three phases: Phase 1, Emergency; Phase 2, Sustainment; and Phase 3, Withdrawal. This newsletter looks primarily at Phase 1 and uses Operation PROVIDE COMFORT as its model.


The remarkable changes in eastern Europe have signaled the beginning of a dynamic period for the Armed Forces and especially for the U.S. Army. With the ever-increasing problems in the Third World, contingency operations will gain emphasis. These changes will impact upon every member of the Total Force and require a review of doctrine to ensure our preparedness for future operations, especially humanitarian assistance operations.

CALL thanks those civilians and military participants who shared their insights and experiences. These tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) are provided for your use and dissemination. If your unit has identified any other combat-relevant lessons, please share them with the rest of the U.S. Army by contacting CALL at DSN 552-2132/4455. Comments concerning this newsletter should be addressed to Commander, Combined Arms Command, ATTN: ATZL-CTL, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-7000.

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HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

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
DALIS (Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System)

The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by Commander, U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1985, IAW AR 25-30.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

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Overview

The Iraqi military brutally suppressed the ethnic insurrections in both Southern and Northern Iraq in the wake of Operation DESERT STORM. President Bush directed that a relief effort be undertaken along the Turkish-Iraqi border to save Kurdish civilians that had fled into the mountains. This effort was initially to air-deliver relief items to the civilians no later than 7 April 1991, and to include plans for medical unit support to be provided in the southern border area of Turkey if this became necessary. In contrast, on 22 March 1991, the 1st Brigade of the 3d Armored Division was tasked to begin humanitarian relief operations. This mission was accomplished, for the most part, with its own military assets.

The humanitarian relief mission in Operation DESERT STORM was marked by the relative absence of Dislocated Civilians during the short ground war." Those that were encountered were mostly in the Safwan, Iraq, area. Essentially non-governmental/ organizations (NGOs) and private volunteer organizations (PVOs) were not available due to the combat environment. Even after hostilities, outside assistance was very sparse because of unexploded ordnance. On the other hand, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was a relief operation from the beginning. Continuing hostilities were a consideration, but not a major factor. There was significant NGO/PVO participation in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.


The Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, established Joint Task Force Provide Comfort (JTFPC) to direct the humanitarian efforts in southern Turkey and northern Iraq. The concept of operations consisted of providing immediate relief items and the development of a force to provide an organized, sustained effort for protracted humanitarian assistance," until international relief agencies and PVOs could assume overall supervision of effort. On 6 April 1991, JTFPC arrived at Incirlik AB, Turkey, and began the first air drop less than 36 hours later.

On 16 April 1991, the President of the United States, authorized by UN resolution 688, expanded Operation PROVIDE COMFORT to include multinational forces with the additional mission of establishing temporary refuge camps in northern Iraq. Combined Task Force Provide Comfort (CTFPC) would oversee the building of shelters and distribution of supplies, ensure order, and provide security throughout this area. The provision of security was essential to get the Kurds to move from the mountains back to their homes and transfer the responsibility for them from the military to international agencies. This was accomplished by simply expanding the security zone.

The tactic of developing smaller camps along family and tribal lines linked to distribution points encouraged Kurdish leaders to take responsibility for camp labor and security. This concept was extremely successful and allowed the multinational force to concentrate on providing supplies, medical assistance, communication, transportation, and outside security. This innovative approach enabled 480,000 refugees to be either turned over to international agencies or returned to their homes. It also allowed the withdrawal of the multinational force from Iraq by 15 July 1991.

The accomplishment of this mission by 12 countries and some 50 relief agencies, without a memorandum of understanding, is a testimonial to the participants' commitment to the humanitarian mission. The uniqueness of this operation can be further characterized by the extensive use of the military in relief roles, the use of military forces already mobilized for Operation DESERT STORM, and the integration of military and humanitarian objectives.

THEATER OF OPERATIONS



SECTION I

EMERGENCY PHASE

This newsletter is structured to address related topics in humanitarian assistance, using Operation PROVIDE COMFORT as its model. This newsletter is applicable to military forces, battalion and above, tasked to provide support to humanitarian assistance missions.

What was unique about Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, and the humanitarian support provided to the Southwest Asian theater following Operation DESERT STORM?

- * In the southern area, around Safwan, Iraq, the effort was required as a direct result of allied combat.
- * In Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the effort involved contingency force intervention (had to have a forced entry, and offensive capability).
- * In both cases, units had to perform not only the humanitarian mission, but also security and internal logistical support.
- * Operation DESERT STORM logistics could easily be redirected.
- * Civil Affairs (CA) command and control elements were already mobilized, but had to be redeployed from Operation DESERT STORM.
- * Special Forces were in Turkey with JTF ELUSIVE CONCEPT during Operation DESERT STORM, and were familiar with the area.
- * Incirlik AB, Turkey (NATO), was operating at full capacity.

INITIAL ASSESSMENTS

Although all of the above assets were in place, the first consideration for any humanitarian assistance mission is to comfort the suffering and alleviate the dying. Some of the initial considerations are somewhat different from what a tactical headquarters would do, for example:

TOPIC: Initial Assessments, Force Structure.

DISCUSSION: The rapid, initial response of coalition forces focused on the provision of food, water, shelter, and medical care. The first efforts of the senior civilian/military leadership were to conduct a coordinated assessment of the life-threatening" needs of the Iraqi citizens. The first helicopter flights made into the mountains carried military personnel who made assessments of the most pressing needs of the citizens. As frustrating as it may be, it takes time to coordinate a more detailed list of cultural needs, e.g., flour, cooking oils. After the most pressing needs were taken care of, Special Forces (SF) teams helped alter the logistics flow. This humanitarian operation showed great sensitivity and concern for ethnic needs.

LESSON(S): In future humanitarian operations, use CA personnel complimented with SF to assist in formulating the following initial assessment needs:

- * Status of hostile military/paramilitary forces in the area.
- * Identification of key civilian leaders, and their supporters.
- * Status of existing public services, such as water, electricity, communications, sewage collection and transportation systems.
- * Status of civil police, doctors, firemen, and their availability, and level of expertise, especially preventive medicine.
- * Medical condition of civilian personnel, and physical locations.
- * Any unique shelter/food needs, and host-nation support availability (e.g., capability to provide construction or transportation assets).
- * Sanitation conditions and medical supplies.
- * Facilities and host-nation resources to support humanitarian assistance forces.
- * Unique social, ethnic, or religious concerns affecting the conduct of the operation.
- * Coordination with other U.S. agencies and international organizations which can contribute to the assessment.

Note: Special Operation Forces are ideally suited to rapidly accomplish initial assessment missions.

COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)

TOPIC: C2, Ad hoc Staffs.

DISCUSSION: During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the JTFs (see Appendix B, Task Organizations) were not allowed to deploy complete staffs. Allowing the complete staff to deploy would have facilitated better initial assessments, and reduced the training time required of new personnel that had not previously worked together.

LESSON(S):

- * Deploy with complete staffs; if reduction is necessary, reduce The staff only after the transition to Phase 2, Sustainment. Do not piecemeal your forces.
- * Time is critical to the accomplishment of the military humanitarian assistance mission. There is simply no time to train new staffs without the risk of increasing the hardships of the personnel you are there to help.

Note: Time Is Critical! Don't Waste It. Take Time To Look at Assessments. Establish Effective C2 Channels.

TOPIC: C2, Communications.

DISCUSSION: Communication objectives must be established up-front. CTFPC grew quickly and expanded rapidly. The communications system consisted of JCS, USAREUR, and USAFE assets that required a two-phased approach to providing service to the field commanders. During the emergency phase, communications must be established that can provide basic services and be rapidly expanded. In the second phase, a robust system increases the grade of services while preventing a simple failure from isolating a location.

LESSON(S):

- * Get minimum equipment on the ground to provide the basic service.
- * Employ additional equipment, and reconfigure connectivity to provide direct routing to principal destinations.
- * Add equipment to provide multiple routes to prevent site isolation.
- * Have sufficient equipment on hand for austere jump capabilities, responsive to new missions and critical outages.
- * Build in redundancy up front.

TOPIC: C2, Chief of Staff (CofS).

DISCUSSION: Not all U.S. services treat the CofS the same; for example, the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army consider the CofS the driving force in the headquarters. However, the CofS is considered just another staff officer in the Air Force and the U.S. Navy.

LESSON(S):

- * Do not assume that multinational or jointly developed staffs understand the unique relationships between staffs. Educate newly developed staffs upon their arrival.
- * Determine unique differences in joint C2 problems and their solutions.

TOPIC: C2, Joint and Combined Staffs.

DISCUSSION: As with many other operations, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT went through several stages with its staff. Phase I (Emergency) was primarily an air operation dictating that the primary staff be mostly Air Force personnel. Phase II was the assistance and resettlement of the refugees which required ground forces, and, last, the withdrawal phase which required primarily an Air Force staff with a small ground capability. The makeup of the CTFPC staff reflected these stages.

LESSON(S):

- * Transition key staff positions.
- * Assign replacements to be the deputy for a period of time.
- * Have each staff establish a continuity file, and review this weekly.

TOPIC: C2, Situation Briefings.

DISCUSSION: The standard military situation briefing does not task organization and conduct of the operation does not place enough emphasis on the supported population.

LESSON(S):

- * Review specialized organizational briefing formats to deal with civil and military situations. Exact title and briefing formats dependent on the situation - organized accordingly with top priority given to the most life-threatening aspects.
- * In the briefing, emphasize the condition and activities and especially the needs of the supported population.

TOPIC: C2, Liaison Officers (LOs)

DISCUSSION: With the number of different countries involved and the obvious language barrier, it was critical to use LOs. They were their commander's representatives and served as facilitators in overcoming doctrinal and tactical differences.

LESSON(S):

- * Language qualifications are important, but not as important as doctrinal and tactical knowledge.
- * LOs should be positioned in both higher and subordinate headquarters to ensure coordination and rapid passing of vital information.
- * UN relief agency liaison personnel must be requested up-front. In this manner, they, as well as military personnel, will have a better understanding of how each operates. The LOs might come from the UN or other major NGOs.

TOPIC: Transit Centers and Camps.

DISCUSSION: Just as important in the C2 arena was the planning and considerations that went into the development of the transit centers/camps. Camps were designed to reflect the cultural realities of the Kurds and to provide for their participation in the decisionmaking process. They were built around a five-person tent, a 66-tent neighborhood (Zozan), a 1,056-person tent village (Gund), a 21,120-person tent community (Bajeer) and in the center, the community center and administration area.

LESSON(S):


- * Refugees should participate in the design of the camp and its operation. As part of the concept of self-sufficiency, they should be used to build and, thereby, take responsibility for its success.
- * Camps should not be elaborate, but should fulfill the basic needs. If the refugees are better off in the camp than in their own towns and homes, they will not go home.

TOPIC: C2 Security Zone.

DISCUSSION: While it was believed that expansion of the security zone south of Dahuk would have facilitated the return of over 300,000 Kurds to the Dahuk area, it was not known whether the Iraqi government could be forced to accept such a security zone expansion. After several high-level meetings, such an arrangement was achieved some six weeks into the operation.

LESSON(S): First, in any humanitarian support mission, consider the effect of expanding your zone of control before designing or building any major camp site or sites.

Note: *In addition to the multinational forces sent to assisting the security mission from the world community, 12 countries provided out patient support, while six provided a medical evacuation capability. Another six sent field/portable hospitals.*



MEDICAL

BACKGROUND: The immediate objectives of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT were to ease the suffering and prevent the Kurdish refugees from dying and to stabilize the population. The medical concept for refugee support was:

- 1) Assessment of needs
- 2) Initial medical care
- 3) Medications/medical supply support
- 4) Sustainment
- 5) Transition to relief agencies.

Doctrine and training relative to the interface between civilian volunteer medical organizations and U.S. military medical personnel need to be developed and implemented. This interface was a perpetual source of control problems that adversely affected treatment coverage and the optimal use of available medical assets.

Preventive medicine strategies should take precedence over therapeutic medicine in the initial stages of a disaster relief and/or refugee situation. All initial efforts in Phase 1 (Emergency) should be directed toward re-hydration of children. Establish a priority of care:

- * Re-hydrate
- * Furnish Potable Water
- * Provide Shelter
- * Furnish Food
- * Provide Sanitation and Health Training
- * Give High Energy Formulas to Children

Work through the local health care system; do not invent a new system with Western standards that the population cannot possibly maintain after we leave.

TOPIC: Medical, Concepts.

DISCUSSION: The concept of vital importance in health care of refugee populations is to work through the local system (no matter how primitive) to get them back on their feet. All organizations involved (including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Red Cross (IRC), and the U.S. Army Preventive Medical civilians, and others) stated that the guiding principle in refugee operations is to get the people back on their feet, revamp, reinforce and build back the local health care system. Don't invent a new system with Western standards that the people cannot possibly maintain after we leave. Use local labor, local facilities, where possible. Sometimes U.S. standards are too far above the local people - work with them, not for them.

LESSON(S): Work through the local health care system. Revamp the existing health care system even if you start with almost nothing. Make this your guiding principle.

TOPIC: Medical, Preventive Medicine.

DISCUSSION: In a disaster relief or refugee situation, preventive black bags and try to give medicines and treat illnesses. This is a serious error. All initial efforts in Phase 1 (Emergency) should be directed toward all those in critical condition, especially dehydrated infants and children. A large tent can be directed toward re-hydration alone; special I-V solutions should be ready - directed by physicians.

LESSON(S):

- * Establish priority of care: treat all life-threatening conditions - re-hydrate; provide water, shelter, food, sanitation, health teaching; need starving children with special high-energy formulas.
- * Set up at least three separate 24-hour-a-day operations to include:
 - (1) Re-hydration center
 - (2) Intensive feeding center for acute starvation
 - (3) Regular normal feeding center.

TOPIC: Medical, Sanitation, Vaccination.

DISCUSSION: In any disaster or refugee scenario, the emphasis should be on sanitation rather than vaccination and treatment. Disaster medical strategy must be planned just like any other - it requires a sequenced plan for first-order business: Sanitation/re-hydration, then therapeutic. The only vaccine that should be considered is measles. The other considerations are preventive strategy and sanitation, food and shelter. Re-hydration should only be done with an oral re-hydration salt (ORS) solution from the World Health Organization. In this type of a disaster scenario - soda pop and powdered milk can be lethal (these do not replenish body salts).

LESSON(S):

- * Measles vaccine is probably the only vaccination that should be given in a disaster. It requires refrigeration (cold chain).
- * Other efforts should be directed toward preventive medicine strategy and sanitation.
- * Work to educate the military medical community about ORS.

TOPIC: Medical, C2.

DISCUSSION: Medical assets should clearly delineate C2. Although medical coverage was provided successfully, the U.S. military medical force structure is not optimally configured for refugee operations, nor is it flexible enough to be altered or tailored as necessary. The medical plan was comprehensive, but medical C2 was not fully responsive to changing conditions and requirements. In this operation, medical assets were receiving orders from three or four different sources, all directing and making demands at the same time.

LESSON(S):

- * Plan for and staff a medical C2 element.
- * Deploy a surgical staff, develop a concept of operations, and get it approved at the highest echelon.
- * Integrate a medical C2 element and staff it into a CA, or Task Force.

TOPIC: Medical, MEDEVAC Requests.

DISCUSSION: Operational units, including civilian doctors on the way into the area, should be trained on how to send the nine-line MEDEVAC request. Many non-U.S. military and civilian personnel did not know or follow a standard format for MEDEVAC. Therefore, wrong coordinates were called, or call signs and frequencies were omitted.

LESSON(S):

- * Have MEDEVAC cards similar to those issued at NTC made available by the LOs.
- * MEDEVAC unit representatives, with or without their aircraft, should be stationed with, or visit, the field units.

TOPIC: Medical, Coordination of Civil Volunteer Groups.

DISCUSSION: UNHCR did not have the resources or authority to definitively coordinate the civilian volunteer groups. Numerous NGOs, and PVOs showed up" from numerous entry points, deployed and set up with no coordination. The NGOs/PVOs can be difficult for the military to coordinate, but can be given priorities on the location of the most severe problem areas. Civilian agencies want to do their own thing" in an emergency situation. They should be encouraged to go where they are really needed. The U.S. Army has the transportation assets to assist them.

LESSON(S):

- * Encourage the civilian groups to step forward to coordinate their valuable expertise and assistance.
- * If you can control transport, you can control placement of civilian relief agencies. Thus they will go where they are really needed. Offer civilians transport only to a specific area where they are critically needed.

TOPIC: Medical, Medical Supply (Logistics).

DISCUSSION: Medical supply worked well from Incirlik Air Force Base (AFB) forward to Diyabakir and Silopi (see figure 1 in section II) A separate supply system was set up for medical supplies with a separate group of trucks that did not have to wait in line with other vehicles going into Iraq.


LESSON(S): Structure similar medical logistics procedures for all disaster contingency planning.

LOGISTICS FLOW

BACKGROUND: The Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System (DALIS), (See Appendix C-1), should be immediately implemented at the CTF level in any humanitarian assistance operation. This system allows for the tracking of all supplies and equipment and their locations worldwide which might be necessary in a disaster situation.

As stated earlier, the initial efforts were Air Force supply drops. This occurred without much ground coordination. Following the establishment of the Combined Support Command and the insertion of Special Forces (SF) troops into the mountain camps, a more coordinated effort began, linking ground and air resupply operations.

The receipt and storage of supplies are sometimes different between services; for example, when the U. S. Air Force receives supplies at an aerial port of embarkation (APOE), it stores these items in hangers separately under the aircraft mission number, in order of arrival. It is very difficult for the Air Force to track, find, and consolidate these items upon requests from the field units. Cross-leveling supplies appears to have been generally slow because of the inability to track delivered materiel during the early weeks of the operation.



TOPIC: Logistics, Host-Nation Transportation Support.

DISCUSSION: Large volumes of equipment and supplies have to be moved to support these types of operations. The operations are very time-sensitive; thus, it is important to use local assets. This helps reduce demands on our own systems. Local assets need to be tightly controlled to ensure that departure times are on schedule, that fuel and maintenance requirements have been met, and that rehearsals are conducted.

LESSON(S):

- * Ensure sufficient numbers of transportation support personnel are available to supervise contracted assets.
- * Ensure coordination is conducted between the transportation unit and the military police who provide security and traffic control.

TOPIC: Logistics, Recovery Support.

DISCUSSION: Vehicles that are used in the transportation of large amounts of supplies over long distances inevitably break down. Therefore, it is important to have a well-planned recovery operation that provides for a quick-response recovery in a tactical environment. This ensures the timely delivery of supplies and provides for adequate security to remain with the main body.

LESSON(S):

- * Ensure recovery operations are well-planned and rehearsed.
- * Develop contingency plans for replacement of long haul vehicles, and recovery equipment.

TOPIC: Logistics, management of Critical Supply Items.

DISCUSSION: Critical supply items, especially in the health area, need to be handcarried through the transportation system. The items were procured from a UN relief company through the Secretary of State/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) contracts. After the items were assigned a unit location number, and had entered the supply system, they were delivered within 24 hours to Incirlik AB, Turkey, by escort to the requesting unit.

LESSON(S): Used augmentees who work directly with the UN and OFDA to ensure the critical items enter the military transportation and supply systems. (Recommend military guards.)

TOPIC: Logistics, Food Distribution.

DISCUSSION: Distribution of food in some camps was controlled by a ration card. This helped reduce and Black-market activities. Another benefit to issuing ration cards is the reduction of incidences concerning intimidation by stronger refugees. The benefits of using local contractors is an economic bonus to the civilian economy.

LESSON(S):

- * Use of local trucks and drivers can be a cost-effective way of providing a supply distribution.
- * A ration card system can be a way of controlling the black market activities in refugee camps.
- * Lack of control for any reason damages the credibility of the U.S. Army and its Allies.

SECTION II

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF)

BACKGROUND: The training, maturity, and quality of the individuals assigned to SOF units made them ideal for this operation. SOF soldiers, with their unique skills, provided the right mix for humanitarian support.

SPECIAL FORCES (SF)

TOPIC: SF, Working with Indigenous Personnel.

DISCUSSION: The SF personnel were sent to the mountains of northern Iraq and southern Turkey as part of JTF-Alpha. They organized the humanitarian assistance operation for the Kurds, using the existing family and tribal organization in their organization of the camps. Indigenous and nomadic people have a traditional organization that is used in everyday life. This organization varies from people to people; however, it generally is organized using the elders as heads of the individual families and tribal leaders based on traditional tribal hierarchy. If any other system is used to determine leadership, then the chain of command will likely fail. If an appointed system is used, the appointed leaders will not be inclined to take control of personnel who hold a higher tribal rank, and the higher ranking personnel will tend not to listen or follow the orders or advice of lower ranking personnel.

LESSON(S):

- * When working with indigenous tribes or personnel, always attempt to find out if there is an internal organization to the personnel.
- * When organizing these personnel, ensure that all leaders have a higher ranking position in the tribal organization than the personnel that they control.
- * Additionally, the most rapid way to organize tribal personnel is to use their organization without change, but with new missions assigned to old positions.

TOPIC: SF, Unconventional Warfare (UW) Doctrine Fits Well into the Humanitarian Mission.

DISCUSSION: The SOF elements, tasked to organize humanitarian assistance for the Kurds, planned and conducted operations using the same techniques that would be used to organize Guerrillas for combat operations. The elements planned, infiltrated, assessed, organized, and trained the Kurdish refugees. However, instead of training the personnel in combat-oriented operations, the SOF soldiers trained the Kurdish personnel to construct sanitation facilities and water storage areas and to control their own people to ensure fair food and water distribution. Additionally, the SF medical personnel not only treated the injured and sick personnel, but also conducted training for the refugees in the prevention and treatment of the various camp sicknesses and diseases such as dysentery.

LESSON(S):

- * The use of SF personnel should be considered in the conduct of refugee operations around the world, when the terrain and hostilities might otherwise prevent the assistance by other means.
- * In this case, SF personnel were received very well. However, in future humanitarian assistance operations, SF may be politically difficult to introduce in certain geographic areas and equally difficult to support as humanitarian assistance workers to international assistance agencies.

TOPIC: SF, Sling-loading of Supplies.

DISCUSSION: The primary rotary-wing means for transporting supplies of the mountain camps was through the use of internal loads. During the supply operations for the mountain camps, the use of internal loads hampered the transport of supplies. This presented a problem. Refugees would, at times, push in close to the aircraft while they were on the ground, causing injuries of refugees and damage to the aircraft. Due to the dangers to the refugees, ground personnel, and the aircraft, landing operations were at one time stopped and replaced by a hovering off-load. Due to the drop, off-loading of supplies from a hover caused the destruction of critical supplies, and injuries to personnel hit by the supplies. The use of a sling load would have prevented the dangers to all parties since the aircraft could have hovered out of danger and placed the supplies on the ground safely. Supply operations would have been more efficient since it takes less time to sling-load supplies than it does to load them internally. Internal and external loads could have been used on aircraft, such as the CH-46, 47 and 53, since they are able to carry large internal loads as well as sling loads. However, with the UH-1H and the UH-60 aircraft, the use of sling load would have ensured faster turnarounds and maximum loading of the aircraft.

LESSON(S):

- * When planning for the use of rotary-wing supply operations, have units ensure that they deploy with all sling-loading supplies and equipment.
- * Recognize the hazards of having refugee personnel in close vicinity of landing aircraft, and plan for the use of sling loads.

TOPIC: SF, Cultural Awareness.

DISCUSSION: The SF soldiers tasked with the Operation PROVIDE COMFORT mission were not area- or language-oriented, since northern Iraq is not their normal area of operation. However, because of their past operations with various people around the world, and past training ranging from the SF qualification course to unit-level training, the soldiers recognized the importance of cultural awareness. Within a matter of days, the SF soldiers knew the customs of the people, allowing them to establish rapport critical to mission success.

LESSON(S):

- * Units must strive to provide their soldiers with a cultural brief, to make them aware of the culture of the people prior to infiltration into their mission area. Remember, even though you can speak the native language, you must still be aware of the cultural aspects of the populace.
- * You cannot expect to interact efficiently with the indigenous populace if you do not understand their customs and way of life.
- * A pre-mission brief and a little effort on the individual soldier's part will go a long way toward mission success when dealing with indigenous people.
- * CA units allocated to geographic areas can provide cultural and area briefing teams or materiels to units in preparation for deployment or after arrival.

In addition to the SF teams in the mountain camps, other SOF, CA, and psychological operations (PSYOP) units were busy accomplishing their missions as well.

Every general officer (GO) interviewed validated the following statement:

"Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was a tremendous success, and JTF- Alpha's Special Forces Teams were the only ones who could have accomplished the mission in the mountains."

CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA)

BACKGROUND: CA units that had been tasked earlier to provide support to Operation DESERT STORM were redeployed in April 1991 to northern Iraq and southern Turkey to support Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. CA units are specifically structured to serve as the commander's executive agent for Civil-Military operations. For this reason, CA units should be among the first considered for inclusion in humanitarian assistance operations. To retain many of the functional skills necessary for some Civil-Military Operations, the majority of CA forces are in the Reserve Components (RC). These skills are practiced as full-time professionals such as civil government, public health services and labor relations. There is an Active Component (AC) unit, the 96th Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion (Airborne), at Fort Bragg, NC. It is both a contingency force, and a Special Operations Force. In many cases, AC units and their commanders are not completely aware of CA capabilities. In addition, they may not be knowledgeable of CA deployment procedures. These factors may cause commanders to "undertask" CA units.

During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, CA units performed these primary missions as well as other command-directed tasks.

- * Coordinated Foreign Nation Support.
- * Provided Civil administration support to a friendly or Allied government.
- * Conducted area assessments, and assisted in preparing area studies.
- * Conducted humanitarian and civil assistance activities and assisted with DC and refugee camps.
- * Identified political, economic, and social vulnerabilities.
- * Served as an interface with UNHCR, NGOs/PVOs.
- * Advised commanders on the conduct of Civil-Military operations.
- * Conducted dislocated civilian operations, including operation of camps.
- * Provided CA liaison and coordination.

NOTE: Additionally, these are the capabilities of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), as an SOF asset:

- * To support SOF in Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and Direct Action (DA) missions.
- * To conduct Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).

TOPIC: CA, C2.

DISCUSSION: Under CA doctrine (FM 41-10 (DRAFT)), C2 of CA assets is exercised at each level through the supported tactical unit. Civil-Military operations and CA are a command responsibility. Command of CA elements is the same as the command of any other military asset, and should follow one of the three standard command relationships in Army doctrine; OPCON, DS, or attached. CA units are allocated to Army units and task forces to assist the commander in carrying out his mission and responsibilities. Command, to include reporting, is exercised through operations channels because civil-military operations are operations. In Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, command of CA units was not always accomplished through operations and command channels. This created confusion and distracted from efficient mission accomplishment.

LESSON(S): Once committed, CA elements, unless otherwise directed, should exercise the chain of command through the unit they support or until the command relationship is changed. All CA commanders must enforce this as a minimal control measure.

TOPIC: CA, Timely Insertion of CA Elements.

DISCUSSION: CA forces arrived in Turkey and Iraq approximately three weeks after the start of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. CA companies (USAR) were deployed from Saudi Arabia. The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) was recalled from block leave from Fort Bragg, NC. The 354th Civil Affairs Brigade Headquarters (-) was deployed from EUCOM. CA assets were bumped from one scheduled flight to make room for tent poles. Early deployment might have allowed CA to work closer with the JTF-Alpha SF Teams from the very start of the operation and to develop a more comprehensive assessment of the situation in the various mountain camps. The CA units that were able to work with JTF-Alpha in the mountain camps provided medical assistance and water distribution expertise.

LESSON(S):

- * All headquarters should include CA personnel in the planning process. Trained CA personnel are available to Army units by assignment of Functional Area (FA) 39 officers to S-5, G-5 shops. FA 39 training includes foreign language, graduate school, CA and PSYOP courses, and regional studies courses.

- * Army units should ensure S-5 and G-5 billets are coded xx/39 on authorization documents to receive school-trained personnel. These personnel should handle all Civil-Military planning. S-5 and G-5 civil affairs slots should not be holding patterns for officers enroute to other duties.

- * Humanitarian assistance is a CA mission. At the beginning of an operation, CA should be integrated at every level.

CA assets performed a variety of missions that would have been foreign to other military assets. They administered DC camps, coordinated with the NGOs, PVOs, and UN-related entities, facilitated visits throughout the area of operation by civilian visitors, performed area assessments, and coordinated extensively with host-nation authorities in Turkey. They also conducted extensive interviews with the NGOs and PVOs in northern Iraq and determined the scope and timing of the expected arrival of their supplies.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)

PSYOPs units were tasked to provide significant quantities of printed material. It was very beneficial for informing the local population about food substances, to stopping rumors. In many cases, unit commanders are unaware of PSYOP capabilities and employment considerations. The following represents PSYOP at the corps level:

PSYOP Battalion:

- * Commands and controls two to seven PSYOP companies, providing PSYOP support to a corps.
- * Plans and conducts PSYOP in support of corps operations.
- * Analyzes, targets, and prepares propaganda for one or two separate, but similar, ethno-linguistic groups on a continuous basis. These groups may be friendly, hostile, or neutral.

Operational Support Company:

- * Plans and conducts counterpropaganda operations.
- * Provides medium printing plant support for the production of printed propaganda.
- * Plans, produces, and disseminates propaganda in direct support of a separate brigade or armored cavalry regiment.
- * May reinforce a tactical PSYOP company.

Tactical PSYOP Company:

- * Plans, produces, and disseminates propaganda in direct support of a division, separate brigade, or armored cavalry regiment.
- * Provides advice and assistance on the planning and conduct of tactical deception operations.

PSYOP CONSIDERATIONS:

- * The corps must ensure continuity with strategic and operational PSYOP being conducted at echelons above corps.
- * Augmentation of the PSYOP battalion by indigenous writers, announcers, illustrators, and interpreters will enhance the operational effectiveness of the unit.


PSYOP campaign plans take too long to approve at the national level. This precludes the rapid integration deployment of these units, but the plans should be complete before deployment of this type unit.

PSYOP units did a superb job in the camps. They developed a tape on registration which was played over and over to ensure everyone knew how to register and how to receive tentage, water, food, and medical treatment. Without PSYOP assistance, registration in the camps would have been 50 percent less effective. PSYOP is most effective when used in communicating verbal and nonverbal (leaflets) themes to the local people.

The PSYOP themes in northern Iraq were:

- * **KURDS** - Self-reliance and cooperation will ensure survival and comfort of all.
- * **IRAQI MILITARY** - Allied forces have the capability and will to protect humanitarian operations.
- * **PKK** - An attack against humanitarian relief will be counterproductive to cause.
- * **IRAQI CITIZENS** - Humanitarian operations in northern Iraq are being conducted in accordance with a UN resolution and are morally correct in the eyes of Allah.

In some cases, during Kurdish demonstrations, the PSYOP unit used loudspeakers if they were available. **Following are some examples of the leaflets that were dropped:**



خه ته را
څالغام!
خوتان دوور نابکه ن
له ریگا .

(JORDIAN)
"DANGER - MINES - STAY ON THE
MAIN ROADS"



(STOP !!)



نا بگره تهم تشنه
(DON'T TOUCH THESE THINGS)



خه بهر بهری
(CALL THE AUTHORITIES)



پولیس بان عه سکمر



نه ماضی قه نه هه ردق موامستنه هه زراته .
هه کراته دی ماضی حویه ناری زونه ژوتنه هه زراته و به کزنا
نه دهنه له ناون هه زراته د هه زراته به کزنا هه زراته به کزنا
و به نه دی زراته هه زراته د هه کزنا به نه زراته به نه زراته .

DISEASE AND ILLNESS ARE
ALSO CAUSED BECAUSE OF
INSECTS, FLIES, AND
BACTERIA WHICH ENTER
YOUR FOOD. IN ORDER TO
PREVENT THIS YOU NEED
TO COOK YOUR FOOD
UNTIL IT IS VERY HOT.
THIS WILL KILL ANY
BUGS OR GERMS IN YOUR
FOOD AND ALLOW IT TO
BE SAFELY CONSUMED.

SECTION III

CIVILIAN RELIEF AGENCIES

BACKGROUND: Neither Joint Service nor U.S. Army doctrine exists in the required detail and depth for refugee-type operations. Although Operation PROVIDE COMFORT was a tremendous success, it demonstrated a need for a doctrinal publication to provide guidance to commanders and staff, delineating planning factors, responsibilities, and methods (FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, has a listing of Civilian Relief Agencies and how they are used in disaster relief and Humanitarian assistance operations). The doctrine should conform as much as possible to the guidance provided by the UN and the Department of State publications dealing with such operations. In addition, the doctrine should distinguish the handling of displaced civilians (DCs) in an occupied area following combat operations (such as southern Iraq) from a refugee or evacuee operation, even though the consequence of combat operations (as in northern Iraq and Turkey) exists. The doctrine should also address the capabilities, and missions of PVOs, NGOs and alternative UN agencies as well as the complications these organizations produce (See Appendix A for list of relief agencies.).

INTEGRATION

TOPIC: Integration, NGOs and PVOs.

DISCUSSION: Initially, coalition forces found it difficult to work with the various civilian organizations and persons involved in refugee operations. In particular, NGOs resented the military and its disciplined approach to the refugee situation, as well as their concern for physical security and the restrictions this imposed on individuals. Gradually, the professionalism and abilities of SF and CA soldiers working the mountain camps voided most concerns, and the attitudes of the NGOs changed.

LESSON(S):

- * Develop both a refugee operations doctrine and an operations methodology publication.
- * Ensure the documents distinguish purely military situations from those that entail cooperation with civilian organizations and eventual transfer of control to these organizations.
- * Recognize that coordination and integration of civilian organizations pose a special problem for military forces in their operations. Senior leader training needs to address the issue.
- * Use CA personnel whenever possible to coordinate activities of these organizations within the commander's operations plan and their training program.

TOPIC: Integration, USEUCOM develops the Civil Agency Relief Element (CARE).

DISCUSSION: The CARE cell was developed to coordinate with the State Department, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, the American Red Cross, PVOs, NGOs, and international organizations. Its mission was to provide essential background knowledge from needed for military decisionmakers. It provided new insights and knowledge of the functioning of the UN relief organizations. This was critical to the success of the operation.

LESSON(S): The CARE cell needs to be set up early and staffed with representatives from all appropriate agencies.

- * The CARE cell needs to have direct access to senior staff and decisionmakers.
- * The CARE cell must be involved in the planning for the transition of the humanitarian effort from military to civilian organizations.

TOPIC: Integration, Lack of Familiarity with Civilian Relief Agencies.

DISCUSSION: Most military leaders and planners are not familiar with civilian relief agencies or the manner in which they conduct civilian support operations. The military had some difficulty in understanding the more loosely organized NGOs and the significance of political and economical factors on their operation. The importance of their role in an operation in which the responsibility for the refugees was to be transferred to them cannot be overemphasized. In many cases, the NGOs and PVOs will go into areas that will provide their organization with the best media coverage as most of these organizations rely on donations for their existence.

LESSON(S):

- * Lead agencies should be identified to represent the multitude of participating NGOs.
- * Military planners should obtain NGOs operational documents, such as the UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies.
- * Military training programs should include overviews of the identity, missions, capabilities and limitations of these agencies.
- * Joint headquarters should include a NGO/PVO liaison as an adjunct to host-nation support functions.

SAFETY

TOPIC: Mines and Munitions.

DISCUSSION: It is critical that leaders ensure personnel avoid areas in a combat zone that have not been cleared, or may be mined. During both Operation PROVIDE COMFORT and Operation DESERT STORM, numerous injuries and deaths could be attributed to personnel moving in areas that were not cleared. Soldiers also picked up or disturbed explosive devices. During Operation DESERT STORM the entire area of operation was saturated by both enemy and friendly mines. The Iraqi force used extensive mine operations. To further increase the threat, scatterable mines and numerous unexploded munitions saturated areas. There were numerous injuries and deaths caused by these devices. In some cases the soldiers were even picking up and transporting armed devices. One of the first incidents to occur was when Kuwaiti submunition in Khafgi, Saudi Arabia. These soldiers discovered and picked up a artillery submunition explosive shape charge; the charge detonated, killing one soldier and injuring others. In northern Iraq there were multiple injuries and, in some cases, deaths to both military and civilian personnel caused by mines.

LESSON(S):

- * Provide soldiers with the training to allow them to identify and void landmines, submunitions, and duds delivered to the battlefield by both air and ground delivery means.
- * Ensure that soldiers do not go unnecessarily into high threat areas that may contain these threats.
- * Be aware that there will always be risks that have to be taken in combat operations; however, leaders must ensure that every risk taken is necessary.
- * Develop an identification training program.

SECTION IV

VII CORPS, SAFWAN, IRAQ

"WE WILL CONTINUE TO PROTECT THE REFUGEES"

BACKGROUND: VII Corps was given the mission on 19 March 1991 to begin humanitarian relief operations in sector, following their efforts during the ground war against Iraq. The 3d Armored Division was responsible for the Safwan area. Following is a summary of this highly successful three-phase Corps operation.

PHASE I

INITIAL RELIEF OPERATIONS. The first phase included food and water distribution and emergency medical care, as well as building the infrastructure to execute this mission.

TASK ORGANIZATION, PHASE 1: Task Force (TF) 4-32 selected the location and provided security for the site. The 122d Main Support Battalion (MSB), Division Support Command (DISCOM) and the Division Surgeon's office provided daily medical assistance, supplies and equipment and administrative and technical support to reestablish the Safwan medical clinic. The 404th Civil Affairs Company provided the administrative resources for bulk food distribution, and coordination with the local population. The 22d Chemical Company assisted in the distribution of supplies at the refugee supply point (Class I, IV, and VIII).

The Brigade was also provided linguists. Throughout the duration of the operation, their number varied between five and twenty-two. Some of their duties were to:

- * Assist law enforcement and counterintelligence missions.
- * Translate medical symptoms and administrative support documents.
- * Assist at check points.
- * Educate the populace on health issues and the dangers of unexploded munitions.

NOTHING SURVIVES FIRST CONTACT; REMAIN FLEXIBLE

The capacity of the initial temporary holding area was quickly exceeded when the number of displaced individuals seeking food and medical assistance grew by an estimated two thousand people in a 24-hour period. A new temporary refugee site (TRS) was then located two kilometers north of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, and the transportation of the refugees to this new site began.

As the refugees entered the TRS, they were searched, registered, and provided food and water. Tents, blankets, shoes, clothing, and materiel for constructing shelters were provided as necessary. As the TRS evolved, the "village elders" established eight states or villages. The eighth village was restricted to single males. The life support system within the TRS was comprised of a medical aid station, a water supply point consisting of three 3,000-gallon blivits mounted on trailers (refills daily), and the daily food delivery point (either MREs, MOREs, or bulk food). The compound had both a trash pit and slit trenches for latrine facilities. It was a constant effort by the TF 4-32 to encourage the residents to maintain even marginal sanitary conditions.

Emergency Ordnance Disposal (EOD) determined that there was enough work for an 11-man EOD detachment for at least six months. Destruction of unstable munitions (Cluster Bomb Units (CBUs)) was first priority with a secondary emphasis on stable munitions. Furthermore, EOD operations would clear Iraq first, then Kuwait. Initially, the brigade was provided one team from the 43rd EOD detachment. On or about 28 March 1991, VII Corps provided the brigade four EOD teams from the 54th EOD. Guidance from Corps stipulated that the clearing effort was to be within a 5-kilometer radius of Safwan as it was a high traffic area. Because of the immediate danger to the local population, as well as to the soldiers, the Brigade distributed thousands of flyers in Arabic warning the populations to stay away from munitions that littered the area. The population was encouraged to provide information on the location of munitions to soldiers. One method used was for local residents to provide a U.S. Army linguist, stationed in the market place, to receive information on the location of dangerous ordnance. The residents would then escort the EOD team to the site. Local residents could also drop off information to the personnel at the Safwan Medical Clinic.

TOPIC: Need for an S-5 in Maneuver Brigades.

DISCUSSION: In Safwan, Iraq, the 1st Brigade, 3d Armored Division, took on the refugee support mission. Within the maneuver battalions and the DS artillery and support battalions, the brigade had sufficient assets to support the mission. But it lacked a staff officer knowledgeable in CA and familiar with local customs, who could deal directly with the local population. The Division CA officer cannot handle affairs for both the division and the subordinate brigades.

LESSON(S):

- * Assign a CA officer to the brigade staff during deployment.
- * While the brigade had several officers on TDY from the States attached to the staff in Southwest Asia who filled special roles, having trained CA officers assigned to the unit would have allowed for a much smoother transition into the refugee support mission and more efficient use of the resources at hand.

TOPIC: Engineer Support.

DISCUSSION: Setting up and operating a refugee camp is very engineer-intensive. Constructing everything from latrines to compound boundaries to living areas required some type of engineer support. Latrines and trash pits must be constantly covered up and redug.

LESSON(S): A dedicated engineer company with one bulldozer and one backhoe must always be available.

TOPIC: Crowd Control.

DISCUSSION: Initially any new policy or procedure was met with confusion and surging crowds. As the refugees became more comfortable with the new policy and procedures, they became more orderly. The refugees were easily stirred up and occasionally staged demonstrations" for the media.

LESSON(S): Initially, use triple concertina wire for crowd control at water and food distribution sites.

TOPIC: Class I.

DISCUSSION: The rations issued to the refugees consisted of MREs, MOREs and B rations. Difficulties arose when bulk food was distributed and had to be broken down into smaller units. Also, MRE and MORE issue resulted in a lot of trash and wasted food.

LESSON(S): Provide food stuffs more suitable to the diet of the refugees. Bulk rice, vegetables, and flour were in demand.

TOPIC: Housing.

DISCUSSION: The refugee camp had several buildings within the compound. As the refugees moved in and filled the buildings, they began to construct housing throughout the compound. Materials from the camp and surrounding areas were used to construct ramshackle houses. There were a few tents available, but not enough. Some of the materials for these shacks came from constructed latrines.

LESSON(S): It is very important to stop the building of ramshackle houses. Tents worked well, especially the big ones obtained from the Red Cross.

TOPIC: Latrines.

DISCUSSION: Over 10,000 people were using the latrines. This required the closing and opening of two latrines daily. The lack of engineer support made this task impossible and led to unsanitary conditions.

LESSON(S): Dedicated additional engineer support is absolutely necessary for sanitary conditions. As a minimum, provide one bulldozer and one backhoe at all times.

PHASE II

Phase II consisted of sustainment and program enhancement. In addition to that mentioned in Phase I, TF 4-32 was also responsible for establishing and administrating local security, law enforcement, and EOD operations within the city of Safwan. The 122nd MSB was responsible for the bulk water distribution within the TRS and Safwan as well as for working with the 12th Engineers in operating the city well. The 404th CA provided some administrative support in managing the TRS, established local water and electrical power projections, and coordination for the repatriation of Iraqis to the Safwan/Bashra area. The 2-3d Field Artillery (FA) was responsible for distributing food to the rural areas surrounding Safwan. They were also tasked to provide the transportation assets needed to distribute supplies (food and water) in support of the humanitarian effort. TF 3-5 Cav and TF 5-5 Cav supplemented the 2-3d FA when additional haul assets were required.

Because of the factional infighting and lack of a governmental infrastructure, the security situation in the Safwan area was very unstable. Pro- and Anti-Saddam groups operated in the area, as well as numerous bandit groups who took advantage of the situation. This situation was aggravated by Iraqi security agents that were attempting to infiltrate the area to identify both antigovernment groups and those cooperating with the Americans. Despite these conditions, the counter-intelligence (CI) team was able to establish a network of sources and working relationships with the local populace which contributed to the protection of the local residents, as well as to prevent any attacks directed against U.S. Forces.

During the beginning of the brigade's occupation of the sector, the 404th CA, 12th EN Battalion, and the Bde S-3 conducted a survey of existing water wells in the area. It was determined that the main water supply came from the city of Az Zubair, approximately 30 kilometers to the north. Since that source was turned off, the only available water came from approximately five agriculture (nonpotable) wells. They also discovered that only one well was able to produce the amount of water required to support the city (20,000 gallons). All others were pumped dry. The well pump which could support the city was repaired by element of the 22d Chemical Company and the 12th Engineers. With that all completed, a Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU) was installed by the 22d Chemical with security provided by the TF 4-32's mortar platoon. The city's water tower and reservoir were cleaned out, and 90,000 gallons of water were pumped into it. Unfortunately, the pump at the pumping station was unrepairable due to the condition of the pipes and equipment, but water was provided to the city by gravity feed.

The brigade interfaced with a variety of agencies in support of the humanitarian mission. The brigade provided food, water, and communications to the personnel working for the International Red Cross and the League of Red Cross (LORC).

In addition to the food and water provided, the LORC was also provided medical supplies as well as hauling assets to transport displaced individuals to various locations. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) set up an office in the TRS and the Abu Daly Red Cross camp. The IOM provided or arranged for protection and assistance to citizens from countries other than Iraq or Kuwait who wished to leave Iraq. Displaced individuals that sought asylum had their name submitted to the proper authorities. However, those wishing to immigrate to the United States were encouraged by the U.S. Embassy to seek asylum with other Middle Eastern countries. The brigade had little contact or dealings with the Red Crescent, the Middle Eastern equivalent to the Red Cross, as its effort was to assist the Kuwaitis and the Egyptians.

During the third week of April, the brigade began preparations to receive and conduct a UN handover. The brigade engineer effort was focused toward the construction of company and observer positions, road construction/clearing operations, and installation of life support systems (tents, latrines, shavers).

TOPIC: Camp Construction.

DISCUSSION: The site chosen for the refugee camp at Safwan already had people occupying the main buildings. The other refugees were quickly moved into the compound area prior to any materials being on hand or before the completion of a plan. The result was that refugees constructed living areas anywhere they could.

LESSON(S): Lay out camp design prior to moving in refugees. Establish tent areas, latrines, and garbage pit areas beforehand, and stick to the plan.

TOPIC: Supply Point Operations.

DISCUSSION: As the Safwan refugee mission grew, so did the volume of supplies. Initially only a platoon was provided to run the supply point, but this quickly grew into an entire company. The division chemical company was given the mission of operating the supply point. Although it did a superb job, a dedicated company with the required MHE would have been better. At times MHE from the FSB would be used to move supplies, thereby depleting the FSB's capability to accomplish its support mission for the brigade.

LESSON(S): Use a supply company in operating a supply point. It is trained and equipped to accomplish the mission on a routine basis.

TOPIC: Food Distribution.

DISCUSSION: During the Safwan refugee mission, units were tasked to provide heavy, expanded mobility tactical trucks (HEMTTs) on a daily basis to transport rations to the camp and checkpoints. The HEMTTs would arrive at the supply point at various degrees of dependability, causing delays in the transportation of food.

LESSON(S): Organize a transportation section that works directly for the supply officer of the refugee mission by using internal assets.

TOPIC: Water for Safwan.

DISCUSSION: The Iraqis removed parts or pumps from the town wells. This severely restricted the water output for the town. Several combat engineers and the TF 4-32 motor platoon worked a water point in town with Army pumps.

LESSON(S): Task a higher echelon construction engineer unit to repair the well equipment or provide new equipment. The mission should have been to operate the town's water points.

TOPIC: Security.

DISCUSSION: A tank company provided security for the refugee camp. Additionally, all males entering the compound were searched for weapons and explosives. The females were not searched except for any bags they were carrying. The CI personnel who worked the interior of the camp were not always present and did not always coordinate their actions.

LESSON(S): There is a need for several female MPs/soldiers to search the females coming into the camp. There should also be a dedicated CI person working for the sector commander.

TOPIC: Law and Order in the Safwan Area.

DISCUSSION: A wide variety of law enforcement tasks were performed during the humanitarian assistance period at Safwan. Several platoons from different MP companies operated in the area. There was no established ROE, and if a suspect was apprehended, he was usually released back into the area.

LESSON(S):

- * Establish clear rules of engagement and place all MPs under the sector commander who should report to the relief mission commander.
- * Establish a confinement facility to hold suspects and keep them as long as needed.
- * Provide clear legal guidance to the sector commander. Commanders need to know the extent of their legal authority while protecting the force. Each sector commander should have available legal personnel to advise him on local laws, international law and U.S. military judicial authority.

TOPIC: Organization of Camp Inhabitants.

DISCUSSION: Due to the size of the refugee camp and the wide range of inhabitants, the camp needed a stable infrastructure. An attempt was made to divide the camp into sections corresponding with the cities of the people hurt by the effort. Daily meetings were held to coordinate camp operations with camp leaders.

LESSON(S):

- * Establish a stable infrastructure and conduct daily meetings.
- * Removal of trash and garbage and general police of camp needs to be stressed daily.

PHASE III

Phase III of the humanitarian effort involved the closing of the TRS and the evacuation of refugees to Saudi Arabia. The 404th CA coordinated the final distribution of seven-day stocks of bulk food to the city of Safwan and provided administrative support for the refugee evacuation plan.

Outlined below is the humanitarian effort in terms of food, water and medical support provided during the 45-day period (21 March 1991 through 6 May 1991). The number of meals reflects the distribution of food made at the TRS, rural food runs, as well as those made in the city of Safwan during the humanitarian and security mission.

- * Safwan residents registered for food: 11,370
- * Refugees registered at the TRS: 13,005
- * Number of meals: 979,822 (MREs/MOREs)
- * Bottled water, case: 173,906 (12 x 1.5 liter)
- * Bulk water, gal: 1,136,700
- * Patients treated: Over 20,000 (mobile MEDCAP and aid station)

On 26 April 1991, while preparing for the UN handover, the USAF conducted an assessment to determine the viability of flying the refugees from Safwan Airfield. Once it was determined that they be flown to a camp in Rahfa, Saudi Arabia (Phase III of the humanitarian effort), the TF 4-32 was responsible for registering the refugees and then transporting them to the airfield where the TF 5-5 Cav took charge as the Departure Airlift Control Group. With 10 interpreters to assist them, the TF 5-5 Cav was also responsible for conducting security searches, billeting and feeding if necessary, preparing the refugees into chocks, palletizing personal belongings, and transporting them from the holding area to the aircraft. The total effort is reflected below:

NUMBER OF FLIGHTS: 95/1 Cargo

NUMBER OF PASSENGERS: 8,375 persons

APPENDIX A

RELIEF AGENCIES

Action Nord-svd	Italian Red Cross
Adventist Develop & Relief Agency	Japan Sotoshu Relief Ctr
American Friends Service Ctr	Maltese Hilfs Dienst
American Red Cross	Medical Volunteers Intl
American Refugee Ctr	Mideast Council of Churches
AMHURT	Operation Mercy
CARE	OXFAM
Catholic Relief Service	Red Cross & Red Crescent
Christian Outreach	Red Cross of Malta
Concern	Samaritan's Purse
Danish Church Aid	Save the Children
Doctors without Borders	Swedish Natl Rescue Board
Doctors of the World	Swedish Rescue Service
Equilibre	Swiss Charity Team
German Bergwacht	Swiss Mission
German Red Cross	Swiss Project of Emer Help
Global Partners	Tear Fund/UK
Helo Mission	Turkish Red Crescent
Hulp Aan Kuterdan	United Nations
Intl Action Against Hunger	UNICEF
Intl Ctr of the Red Cross	World Council of Churches
Intl Medical Corps	World Food Program
Intl Refugee Year Trust	World Relief Intl
Intl Rescue Ctr	World Vision Relief & Develop
Irish Concern	World Vision, Australia

APPENDIX B

TASK FORCE ORGANIZATIONS

HQ JTF-ALPHA

10 SFG (+)
- 1 -10 SFG
- 2 -10 SFG
- 3 -10 SFG
- 40/3 COMMANDO BDE
(ROYAL MARINE) (UK)
- SOCA TMS/112 SIG BN
x 6
- NRI TRNS/112 SIG BN
x 2
- EI/4th FIELD
AMBULANCE(CAN) x 2
- TMS/432 CA CO x 5
(CS)
- PSYDET/6/4 POG (DS)
- TM/39 TACG (EOD)
(DS)
39 SOW (+)
- 7 SOS (+)
- 21 SOS (+)
- 67 SOS (-)
- 667 SOMS
- 1723 STS (+)
SSD/52 SIG BN

HQ JTF-BRAVO

24 MEU (SOC)
- BLT 2/8
- HMM 264
- 3/325 ABCT (-)
- 3 IT SF TEAMS
4TH AVN BDE 3ID (US)
- 6-6 CAV
- TF 23 (-)
- ANGLICO FCT 6
3D CDI BDE RN (UK) (-)
- 45 CDO BN (-)
- 1 ACG (NL) (-)
- 2 ANGLICO FCT 6
FRENCH FORCE
- BN FR PARAMARINES
- 1 SPANISH PLT
- 3 IT SF TEAM
- ANGLICO FCT 2
SPANISH EXPED
FORCE
- PARA BN (-)
- ANGLICO FCT 3
ITALIAN FOLOGRE
BDE
- 3 INF COs
- SF CO (-)
- ANGLICO FCT 4
18TH MP BDE
18TH MP BDE

CIVIL AFFAIRS

COMC
354TH CA BD (-)
TASK FORCE CIV - AG
- 354TH CA BDE (-)
432D CA CO (-)
- JTF-A
418TH CA CO
- 431 ST
- 432D
- JTF-B
96TH CA BN (A/C)
-3D CDO BDE

COMBINED SUPPORT COMMAND

21ST TAACOM (-)
- 9TH MMC (-)
- 21ST PER GP (-)
- 9TH FIN GP (-)
- 16TH CHEM DET (-)
- AMC (-)
- 82 ORD CO (-)
- 72D EOD
- 279TH SIG PLT (-)
- 70TH TRANS BN (-)
- 14TH TRANS BN (MC)
29TH ASG (-)
- 66TH MAINT BN (-)
- 5TH MAINT CO (-)
- 51ST MAINT BN (-)
- 5TH QM DET (-)
- SSIG
- 593D S&S CO (-)
CTF SURGEON (-)
- 7TH MED LOG
- 159TH AIR AMB
- C/3 FSB/3ID
- C/501 FSB/1AD
- 99TH MED DET
CMAGTF 1-91
- LSB BN (-)
TF PROVIDER
- HHC/4/81C
- TF SKYHAWK
- 4/11TH ACR
- H/4/8ID
- D/502/70TH TRANS
- E/502/70TH TRANS
- 1/4/8IC
- 501ST MED
- 44TH SIG

TASK FORCE 60

USS FORRESTAL/
CVW-6
- USS DALE
- USS YORKTOWN
- USS DEYO
- USS GALLERY
- USS DEWERT
- USS MILWAUKEE
- USS BUTTE
- USS PHOENIX
- USS GATO
- USS SHENANDOAH
USS THEODORE
ROOSEVELT/CVW-8
- USS BELKNAP
- USS RICHMOND K.
TURNER
- USS VIRGINIA
- USS LEYTE GULF
- USS WILLIAM V.
PRATT
- USS CARON
- USS VREELAND
- USS HAWES
- USS PREBLE

AFFOR

7440 COMP WING
(PROV)
- 81 TAC FTR WG (A-10)
- 86 TAC FTR WG (F-16)
- 36 TAC FTR WG (F-15)
- 552 ACACW
(E-3 AWACS)
- 303 STRAT WG
(KC/RC-135)
- 39 TAC GP
- 43 ECS(EF-111/EC-130)
- 52 TAC FTR WG (F-4G)
- 123 TRS (RF-4)
COMALF
- 37 TAC AIRLIFT SQ
(C-130)
- 61 TAC AIRLIFT SQ
(C-130)
- 302 TAC AIRLIFT WG
(C-130)
- 317 TAC AIRLIFT GP
(C-130)
- 143 TAC AIRLIFT GP
(C-130)
- 58 MAS (C-12/C-21)
- FRENCH AF
(C-160/DHC-6)
- ITALIAN AF
(G-222/AY-22)
- BELGIAN AF (C-130)
- CANADIAN AF (C-130)
- PORTUGUESE AF
(C-130)
- ROYAL AF (C-130)
COM HELO-
PROVIDER OPS
- 4/8 AVN (UH-60)
- 4/11 ACR (UH-60)
- 502 AVN (CH-47)
- ROYAL AF (CH-47)
- ITALIAN AF
(CH-47/UH-1)
- GERMAN AF
(CH-53/UH-1)
- 159 MED DET (UH-60)
COM HELO JTF-B
- HMN-264 (CH-53/
CH-46/UH-1/AH-1)
- 4/3 AVN
(AH-64/OH-58/UH-60)
- SPANISH AF
(CH-47/UH-1)
- FRENCH AF
(PUMA/GAZELLE)

APPENDIX C

DISASTER ASSISTANCE LOGISTICS INFORMATION SYSTEM (DALIS)

BACKGROUND: During the April 1991 Kurdish Relief effort, no comprehensive procedures for humanitarian support requirements were in existence. As a result, the U.S. Army's 353d Civil Affairs Command and the 354th Civil Affairs Brigade, in cooperation with other national and international agencies, developed a software program to track such humanitarian support. A DOS-based logistics inventory system (DALIS) is the result of those efforts.

In February 1992, following the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the need for competent coordination of a massive world-wide humanitarian relief effort was European Command (USEUCOM), now provides in-depth tracking of relief supplies that are required and provided by humanitarian assistance organizations and agencies. DALIS version 2.0 has been upgraded to enhance the operations of one or more Logistics Coordination Centers (LCCs) supporting multiple world-wide humanitarian relief operations.